

Philosophical Contributions to the Discourses on War and Peace: The Influence of Market Liberalism and Marxist Socialism*

Ulrich GLASSMANN ¹

¹ Prof. Dr., Comparative Institutional Analysis, International Institute for Management,
Interdisciplinary Centre for European Studies, Europa-Universität Flensburg

Abstract

This article deals with the philosophical contributions to the discourses on war and peace. In particular it examines the influence of market liberalism and Marxist socialism. It approaches that topic from a historical perspective, asking how philosophy contributed to nationalist and authoritarian discourses in Europe just prior to World War I and II. The aim is to prompt reflection on how antagonistic theoretical concepts – particularly market liberalism and Marxist socialism – affect acts of war and peace and to deepen critical awareness of these concepts in current debates on contemporary problems concerning political polarization and conflict. My approach strongly argues against fatalist conceptions in philosophy which support irreconcilable political attitudes on matters concerning the political economy of a country. Instead, it argues in favour of a perspective elaborated by Karl Polanyi which assumes that free markets need to be embedded in democratic structures and generous welfare states if (social) peace is not to be endangered. Therefore, it should rather be read as a general argument on the influence of fatalist philosophical concepts on political discourses, not as a detailed historical analysis or a comprehensive philosophical overview.

Keywords: War, Peace, Market Liberalism, Marxist Socialism, Polanyi

* This article originated from a key note closing speech given at the 5th International Philosophy Congress on War and Peace held at the Uludağ University, Turkey, in 2018.

Savaş ve Barış Söylemlerine Felsefi Katkılar: Piyasa Liberalizminin ve Marksist Sosyalizmin Etkisi

Özet

Bu makale savaş ve barış söylemlerine felsefi katkıları ele almaktadır. Özellikle, piyasa liberalizminin ve Marksist sosyalizmin etkisini incelemektedir. I. ve II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan hemen önce Avrupa'da milliyetçi ve otoriter söylemlere felsefenin nasıl katkı sağladığını sorarak, konuya tarihsel bir perspektiften yaklaşmaktadır. Çalışmanın amacı, birbirine zıt kuramsal kavramların—özellikle de piyasa liberalizminin ve Marksist sosyalizmin—nasıl savaş ve barış eylemlerini etkilediği üzerine düşünmeyi istemek ve siyasi kutuplaşmayla ve çatışmayla ilgili güncel sorunlar hakkındaki güncel tartışmalarda bu kavramların eleştirel farkındalığını derinleştirmektir. Benim yaklaşımım, bir ülkenin politik ekonomisine ilişkin konularda uzlaşmaz politik tutumları destekleyen, felsefedeki kadercî anlayışlara şiddetle karşı çıkıyor. Bunun yerine benim yaklaşımım, (sosyal) barışın tehlikeye atılmaması için serbest piyasaların demokratik yapılara ve cömert refah devletlerine dâhil edilmesi gerektiğini varsayan Karl Polanyi'nin detaylandığı bir bakış açısını savunuyor. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma detaylı bir tarihsel analiz veya kapsamlı bir felsefi bakış açısı olarak değil de; kadercî felsefi kavramların siyasal söylemler üzerindeki etkisine dair genel bir argüman olarak okunmalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Savaş, Barış, Piyasa Liberalizmi, Marksist Sosyalizm, Polanyi

Corresponding Author	:	Ulrich Glassmann Comparative Institutional Analysis, International Institute for Management, Interdisciplinary Centre for European Studies, Europa- Universität Flensburg, Germany
E-mail	:	ulrich.glassmann@uni-flensburg.de
Manuscript received	:	January 25,2019
Revised manuscript accepted	:	March 10, 2019

Philosophical Contributions to the Discourses on War and Peace: The Influence of Market Liberalism and Marxist Socialism

1. Introduction

We live in times of rising societal division and growing support for authoritarian rule. In addition to the political instability, civil war and international conflict which has unfolded in the “Arab Spring” countries, nationalism in Europe and elsewhere in the world has recently experienced a dramatic increase. Hence, understanding the philosophical contributions to discourses on war and peace is of central relevance to our day. This article approaches that topic from a historical perspective, asking how philosophy contributed to nationalist and authoritarian discourses in Europe just prior to World War I and II. Such a broad topic clearly cannot be addressed in sufficient detail within the context of this paper. Rather, my aim here is to prompt reflection on how antagonistic theoretical concepts – particularly market liberalism and Marxist socialism – affect acts of war and peace. My hope is to help deepen critical awareness of these concepts in current debates on contemporary problems concerning political polarization and conflict.

My interest in topics related to war and peace was triggered at a very young age. The defining moment came when I first saw and heard a televised speech given by Joseph Goebbels, the German Reichsminister for “People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda” (as his position was officially titled). It was the speech he gave in Berlin in 1943, in which he presented the so-called totalitarian war strategy of the German national socialist government. The speech culminated in the horrendous question to the audience: “Do you want total war? Do you want it to be more total and radical than we can possibly imagine today?” As a young man who was at that moment probably the same age as my father was when the war ended, I was terrified by this speech during which the raging masses shouted out “yes, yes!” in answer to the terrible question. Even if Goebbels’ speech was to some extent a well-prepared and well-orchestrated publicity stunt, the enthusiasm for total war that his words reflected and aroused was and is horrific to watch. His “argument” was that Europe was under threat from Eastern Bolshevism, which – Goebbels asserted – aimed to promote a Jewish world revolution whose true goal, under the guise of bolshevism, was to install a capitalist Jewish tyranny.

The words “Jewish” and “capitalist” (but also “bolshevist”) were used interchangeably by the Nazis who actively promoted the idea that the capitalism unleashed during the 19th

century by international financial institutions was an enemy of the German population and that Jews – as people in diaspora unbound by national sentiment – were its active agents. With their battle cry for the unity of proletarians across nations, Marxist socialism and communism were also strongly international in their focus. However, during the Weimar Republic none of these camps seemed to offer a viable political choice to those citizens who believed that national tradition and identity were at stake. For this portion of the German population the profound societal and economic changes of the previous decades could easily dismantle national culture.

A tectonic institutional shift had taken place during the 19th century, one for which Jews were later held responsible. German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1887) described this radical change as a shift from feudal community (*Gemeinschaft*) centred around family or kinship, neighbourhood and friendship to a capitalist society (*Gesellschaft*) based on individualism, urban life and cosmopolitan thinking. It is no coincidence that National Socialist propaganda brought back the term *Gemeinschaft* as *Volksgemeinschaft* in reference to the Nazi vision of revitalizing a community based on tradition, rather than one oriented towards the principle of self-regulating markets which allegedly estranged people from each other.

Political concepts around the turn of the century, which rested on philosophical ideas about economic and societal organization, focussed on class division and international cooperation. While market liberalism and Marxist socialism were polar opposites with respect to the classes they sought to protect, both concepts rested on the idea that capitalism was an indispensable driving force of societal development, with frequent allusions to “fatalism” to be found in the discourses on both. Both also viewed national protectionism as an outdated policy approach. Political ideas at the polar ends of the ideological spectrum failed to offer serious options for reducing class conflict and reinforcing national unity.

2. Karl Polanyi’s interpretation of the societal and economic changes of the 19th century: The age of market liberalism

But what had caused this gridlock between societal groups in Germany, given the enormous progress Europe had witnessed during the 19th century with respect to political constitutions, economic innovation and societal liberalism? Arguably, one of the most plausible answers to this question to date is that offered by Karl Polanyi, the Austro-Hungarian economic sociologist. Polanyi’s 1944 critique on free market capitalism *The Great*

Transformation starts with a puzzle – not on the causes of war, but on the causes of peace. His first chapter “The Hundred Years’ Peace” is a brilliant observation of what happened after the Napoleonic wars in 1815, during the period of restoration, and before the start of World War I in 1914. The major powers at the time, Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia Italy and Austria, had been at war for only 18 months during this entire period – an enormous achievement in comparison to earlier European wars, such as the Thirty Years’ War of 1618-1648. Apart from the French-German War in 1870/1871, which, however intense, had lasted less than a year, and a few other conflicts such as the war on Crimea, the 19th century was a comparatively peaceful period. When we also consider the colonial crimes of the European nations during this century, however, the peace record definitely looks less bright; and as Polanyi conceded, the same can be said for other parts of the world in which decline was more characteristic than stability and peace. In particular, the decline of the Ottoman Empire created terrible new conflicts. And yet, the phenomenon of the “Hundred Years’ Peace” in Europe is worth scrutinizing. If we follow Polanyi’s thesis, the question raised earlier – “How was (total) war possible?” – becomes a different, equally challenging question: How was peace possible?

Polanyi’s own answer to this question is complex, but his central thesis was that the economic interests of European nations during the 19th century prompted them to build two economic institutions (one international and one national) which initially helped to keep the peace. The first institution was the international monetary system, the second was a system of free markets for national economies.

In the realm of international monetary exchange, one of the most outstanding institutions for peace was the gold standard, which offered a reliable system for stabilizing exchange rates. Great Britain introduced the gold standard in 1844 and most other nations wanting to trade with Great Britain followed its lead. Of course, the so-called Pax Britannica rested on British self-interest. As the country in which the industrial revolution began, Great Britain promoted the “British Peace” as a well-designed institutional arrangement securing international trade, to the advantage of the British Empire. However, as free trade seemed beneficial to them as well, other countries followed. Germany introduced the gold standard in 1871. With many European nations converging on a system to secure fixed exchange rates, the system became the cornerstone for a relatively well functioning international trade regime within Europe. The gold standard required each country to insure that one-third of

the national currency was convertible into national gold reserves. This system certainly had positive effects on national economies, but also some major limitations. First, it prevented national governments from issuing money in mere accordance with their policies, for instance to finance wars. It is rather telling that one of the first countries to go off the gold standard was Germany in 1914 in order to finance World War I. Analysing the German war economy in a brilliant article published in 1915, John Maynard Keynes concluded that Germany was at that time about to generate massive public debt which would lead the country into a phase of terrible inflation once the war ended (Keynes, 1915). And he was right: in 1923 Germany, of course also burdened with enormous reparation payments, experienced a severe crisis which led to hyperinflation and, ultimately, to the breakdown of the German currency. Such developments would have been unlikely, had Germany maintained its commitment to the gold standard. A second effect of the gold standard was to hinder currency speculations. An attack on the financial system by foreign governments and organizations was much more difficult to implement under the gold standard, which also helped to keep the peace between European nations.

According to Polanyi, the acceptance of the gold standard among European nations was preceded by the rising influence of high finance. This is how he labelled the system of international banking which sought every possible opportunity to promote investment regardless of the conflicts between nations. Governments feared, he noted, that these banks would withdraw capital if they discovered that their public budget was too unbalanced. Such scenarios affected the national currency negatively and increased the states' likelihood of defaulting on credit agreements. Thus, their growing dependence on high finance led governments to act more responsibly – at least vis-a-vis financial institutions. Surely, I am not alone here in being reminded of what happened to Greece after the 2008 financial crisis. The suspension of democracy in that country must be seen as the downside of an international market integration in which governments are accountable not to the general public, but rather to credit-giving financial organizations.

The experience of Greece offers a good illustration of what happened to some of the countries that had accepted the gold standard during the 19th century. Much like the European currency union, which does not allow single members to opt for a currency devaluation, the gold standard did not allow for autonomous manipulation of the currency as it was fixed to gold. For countries with a negative trade balance the effects on the real

economy were very similar to those experienced by Greece during the last decade: rising unemployment, austerity measures, and growing poverty.

While Polanyi highlighted the gold standard as an important measure for international cooperation maintaining the “Hundred Years’ Peace”, he was also critical of the self-regulating market theorem and unregulated free trade. On the one hand, he noted, the gold standard was a useful instrument with which to build an effective international trade regime; on the other, it created dangerous asymmetries among nations and fostered hostile competition between them in the global economy. To compensate for internal devaluation, in the form of falling wages, domestic unemployment, and depression of the national economy, European nations sought privileged access to raw material and protected production abroad.

Colonisation overseas became the instrument through which European nations maintained their individual positions of power within the system of free trade they had created. For this reason, the rules they had set for themselves regarding civil liberties, free enterprise and trade did not apply to the colonies, where tariffs abounded and protectionism flourished. This, Polanyi concluded, was how the impulse of a “rush for empire” had emerged among European nations. Every nation that wished to profit from the system of free trade had to compensate for possible internal devaluations by enslaving the colonial population. Empire building became an economic imperative and led to alliance building. However, efforts in that direction, such as the creation of the Entente Cordiale, ultimately led to war between opposing alliances. In Polanyi’s view, high finance and the gold standard were largely responsible for the “Hundred Years’ Peace”. On the other hand, though, the radical reliance on these institutions and its inhumane compensation mechanisms incrementally paved the way for the catastrophe of World War I.

The same can be said for the second institutional shift taking place during the 19th century on the national level: free market economies. Before Adam Smith’s (1776) famous publication, *The Wealth of Nations*, economists believed in mercantile theorems which in essence demanded autarky in agriculture, protectionism through tariffs, and export surpluses in trade. The reason for this was the idea that the international economy was a zero-sum game. According to these beliefs, markets could not grow and expand under a free trade system, for foreign imports were perceived as a destructive force which crowded out national production. Again, the major aim of protectionist economic policies was to support the states’ opportunities to go to war. From a mercantile perspective, this was only possible if economies

achieved an active trade balance. Import of foreign currency, which increased the treasury's reserves, needed to exceed the export of national currency to other countries. By deploying this simple mechanism, governments managing to produce favourable trade balances attempted to collect more financial resources than rival countries. The Machiavellian aim was to ensure a superior status in terms of a state's ability to finance the next military conflict.

In this context, the liberal economic theory developed by Adam Smith was indeed revolutionary. It turned this idea up-side down and claimed that the creation of wealth depended on market freedom, not protectionism. Throughout the 19th century European states started to implement liberal ideas and create market economies. The 19th century virtually became the age of liberalism, even if the ways and means behind this change were much contested by Marx and Marxian socialists and communists. According to John Kenneth Galbraith (1958), liberal authors – mainly Smith, Ricardo and Malthus – formed the “central tradition” in economics and economic philosophy. The gradual implementation of their ideas led to the emergence of market economies, as described in the “The Great Transformation” and the success of this development required institutional change to support three major principles on which the political economy of European nations then rested.

The first principle concerned trade. At the beginning of the 19th century many German territories still dealt with tariffs, even between the provinces of one state. Prussia, for instance, abandoned these tariffs in 1818. The same was accomplished with tariffs between these states. The establishment of the Single European Market in 1992 has been a very similar process, on which the impact of market liberalism's recent rise to power was comparable to that of its epoch-changing influence at the end of the 19th century – even if national economies, being more based in market principles already, were by then completely different than they were in the late 1800s.

The second principle concerned free enterprise, which was (partly) achieved by abolishing the guild system. While guilds had experienced a steady decline after the Napoleonic reforms, the system was still in place in European countries at the beginning of the 19th century and controlled prices, wages, market entry, product quality and the like for each occupation. Again, Prussia abandoned this system and established the rule of free enterprise in 1810. Other territories introduced the rule much later; Saxony, for instance, did not abolish it until 1861. With the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, however, the system was applied to all its territories.

The third principle focused on agricultural reforms. In Great Britain, agricultural workers had enjoyed freedom of movement since the abandonment of the Speenhamland laws in 1834. This law had protected workers from excessively low income by subsidizing agricultural products with funds from local communities. However, this meant that peasant workers were not free to move from one locality to another, as community subsidies bound them to a specific local administration and its territory. Free labour markets became established by abandoning such instruments of state intervention. And surely, freedom was an ambivalent term, as the new opportunity to move came at the cost of losing protection. Exploitation and poverty were frequent consequences of this development.

Thus, the 19th century saw a “Great Transformation” of societies which became dominated by the ideas of market liberalism. The transformative aspect consisted of a diminished societal influence on economic activity. While trade, craft production, industry and finance formerly had been embedded in the rules of societies, their tradition, religious and other practices, the economy became dissociated from such traditions and started to work as an autonomous system in accordance with its own logic. Instead of being dependent upon customs and tradition, capitalist rules and economic liberalism now began to dominate societies – instead of preserving societies’ traditions, liberalism seemed to eliminate them.

3. Werner Sombart’s interpretation of the societal and economic changes of the 19th century: A socialist critique on market liberalism and British philosophy

While on the surface the 19th century was a century of relatively peaceful development – at least by Polanyi’s standards – at a deeper level this period witnessed profound conflicts and societal divisions. As market forces began to atomize local communities and isolate individuals from them, people grouped together to form movements that defended or contested the new order. Yet, while we may agree with Polanyi’s views on the destructive forces of market liberalism, some socialists have turned this critique on liberalism into an aggressive attack on other European cultures, and British philosophy in particular.

A good example of this can be found in the writings of the German Marxian Socialist Werner Sombart. Beyond the utter disrespect for English philosophy which typified Sombart’s work, one finds here the expression of outright racism. In his infamous 1915 book, *Merchants and Heroes*, Sombart set the tone by stating that “The foundation of all English culture must arguably be seen in its immeasurable narrow-mindedness...” (Sombart, 1915, 9). He went on

to curse the works by Francis Bacon, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. While conceding that these authors might be highly appreciated as philosophers in England, Sombart claimed that in Germany such thinkers would hardly be known as philosophers, but rather as economists. The reason for this difference of perception, he argued, lay with English culture's general focus on money and trade. In his view, this focus had led English philosophy to be overwhelmingly concerned with economic matters. Sombart labelled this worldview "Händlergeist" or "commercial spirit". As a people from the geographical heartland of the industrial revolution and the driving force behind the emergence of the "central tradition" (Galbraith, 1958) in economics and economic philosophy, the English had attached an existential meaning to the pursuit of comfort and well-being. Promoting the achievement of a state of well-being was the aim of all English philosophy, in Sombart's view, which demanded a kind of philosophy that could help clarify how all the material goods needed for a comfortable life could be supplied.

Nothing of that, Sombart argued, could be found in German culture and philosophy, which he thought must be characterized as being "heldisch" (heroic) instead of commercial. In opposition to the worldly concerns of British philosophy – for example, supply and demand of commodities, efficient allocation of labour and capital etcetera – Sombart considered German philosophy to be everything that English philosophy is not. German philosophy, he asserted, developed in opposition to the theories arising in England during the 18th century. Philosophical ideas typical of this period in England focused on the pursuit of happiness and pleasure (Bentham). They were utilitarian and rather pragmatic in nature.

Although German philosophy was enormously diverse with respect to its ideas and approaches, even Schopenhauer, Hegel, Fichte and Nietzsche had found common ground in one regard: prioritizing the pursuit of happiness, they believed, stood in polar opposition to all of German philosophical thought. While Fichte also found an attitude that put good health at the centre of human concern to be negative, as Sombart (1915) noted, it was Nietzsche who was most critical of English philosophy, because he argued against free markets and an approach which assumed that "all men are created equal." In "Also sprach Zarathustra" (Thus spoke Zarathustra) Nietzsche elaborated:

"Ye higher men, learn this from me: On the market-place no one believeth in higher men. But if ye will speak there, very well! The populace, however, blinketh: "We are all equal."

“Ye higher men,”— so blinketh the populace — “there are no higher men, we are all equal; man is man, before God—we are all equal!” Before God!—Now, however, this God hath died. Before the populace, however, we will not be equal. Ye higher men, away from the market-place!” (Nietzsche, 1883 {2016}, 73:1).

Here, Nietzsche highlighted “the market-place” as a secular institution which demands equal opportunity and was founded on the ideas behind British enlightenment and the principles of the American Revolution. Equality, he claimed, would do away with all “great ideas” and stop the search for truth except that which served to illuminate economic principles, thereby ending philosophy of the German kind. In *Merchants and Heroes* Sombart elaborated on this perspective and subsequently interpreted the rise of liberalism in the 19th century as an attack on German culture. Despite being a socialist, Sombart therefore welcomed World War I as an act of liberation through which Germany emancipated itself from British ideas. In fact, he calls World War I “The War of Nietzsche”, an expression which appears to have been widely used at the time.

How to make sense of these diverse liberal and socialist perspectives on the “Great Transformation” of the 19th century? The erection of an international trade regime, the influence of high finance, and the dominance of free markets and free enterprise over domestic politics and tradition have all been interpreted as ruining the foundations on which (at least according to Sombart) Germany’s culture rested. Far from being a fearful prospect, the end of the “Hundred Years’ Peace” was enthusiastically welcomed in Germany, especially by socialist intellectuals like Sombart. The hope was that instead of continuing on the path of market liberalism, which had fostered an ethic of rights and entitlement, the new European order would follow a German ethic based on duty and sacrifice: not Smith and Bentham, but Marx and Hegel. While markets alienated individuals from each other, dissociating them from the community, and reduced their existence to that of servants working for the “happiness machine”, German philosophy portrayed an idea of the state for which the individual was supposed to (heroically) sacrifice himself. Under this concept, claims for individual rights were illegitimate.

4. Friedrich August von Hayek's interpretation of societal and economic change: A liberal critique on socialist collectivism and national aggression in the 20th century

It was this constellation of collectivism, nationalism and antiliberalism in Sombart's pamphlet (expressed as "Vaterlandsidee" und "Militarismus") that later caught the attention of the liberal economist Friedrich August von Hayek. In his famous book *The Road to Serfdom*, Hayek offered a liberal perspective on the causes of war and fascism which opposed Sombart's view:

From 1914 onward there arose from the ranks of Marxist socialism one teacher after another who led, not the conservatives and reactionaries, but the hard working labourer and idealist youth into the National Socialist fold. It was only thereafter that the tide of nationalist socialism attained major importance and rapidly grew into the Hitlerian doctrine. The war hysteria of 1914, which, just because of German defeat, was never fully cured, is the beginning of the modern development of National Socialism, and it was largely with the assistance of old socialists that it rose during this period. Perhaps the first, and in some ways the most characteristic, representative of this development is the late Professor Sombart, whose notorious *Händler und Helden ...* appeared in 1915 (Hayek, 1944 {2007}, p. 182-183).

Although, Hayek accurately analysed the dangerous tendencies underlying collectivist ideas on the regulation of political economies as they had been promoted by Sombart, the liberal answer to the question of how the erosion of social peace and the emergence of inequality and poverty could have been stopped was no less dangerous. Throughout the decade of the 1920s, stock market speculation had become a widespread phenomenon in the United States and elsewhere. Many investors had participated in the funding of dubious real estate projects and had purchased equity shares with the support of credit-financing agencies. Thus, the Great Crash of 1929 became an inevitable consequence of this short-sighted investment behaviour. The Great Depression which followed in the United States and in some countries of Europe stimulated a debate among economists about appropriate policies which would have contained the dramatic consequences in the real economy. Hayek assumed that governments could do nothing to rescue companies that experienced decline and laid off workers. Instead, he proposed a non-interventionist policy approach and favoured "liquidationism." Liberal economists argued that markets needed to equilibrate again. Like Marxist socialism, liberalism did not offer any political choice which would have

improved the situation of the hard-working labourer and the unemployed. International market dynamics were considered a natural force; the main difference in contrast to Marxist socialism was that liberal theory assumed a beneficial societal outcome if capitalist economies remained unregulated.

5. Conclusions

The antagonism of mutually exclusive philosophical interpretations of history had paved the way for nationalism and National Socialism, leading to World War I and World War II, respectively. For some, market liberalism had destroyed the cohesion of modern societies and reduced any meaning of human existence to economic exchange. For others, the idea of socialist collectivism had led workers and youth to support nationalist and, ultimately, national socialist policies that promoted protectionism and suspended individual rights.

But between Marxian socialists with a racist stance (Sombart) and radical liberals with no concern for the unfair social consequences of free markets and trade (Hayek), there was always Polanyi's rather appeasing perspective. Neither liberalism nor the socialist principle of publicly promoted redistribution is a destructive force in and of itself. Rather, both principles depend upon each other and must ultimately be calibrated in a political discourse.

Thus far, I have tried to show that liberal and socialist philosophy have historically played a key role in helping polarize societies, with each camp perceiving the other as an existential threat to its own ideology and existence. This dynamic suggests that the rigidity of philosophical reasoning, which is so beneficial to logical insight, may not always be compatible with the demand for political compromise and disagreement. For if such thinking motivates a given social group to try to suspend political discourse in favour of its own ideas, which can easily happen in politically polarized societies, (social) peace and civility rapidly come under threat. This was true for the 19th and the 20th century as it is true for contemporary politics. As we can find plenty of analogous situations during the period between the development of liberalism in the 19th century and World War I, and the interim period between the two wars, and in today's world – in which markets have become ever more integrated, financial institutions have risen to enormous global power, and the financial crisis has shaken global capital markets and led many countries into a major recession – the question emerges as to whether we can find an alternative than reverting to nationalism and protectionism.

Returning to the speech by Goebbels, mentioned at the beginning of this article, it may seem clearer now, why the German Minister for Propaganda found it easy to portray both bolshevism and capitalism as threats to German culture and to the future of Europe. Marxist socialism as well as market liberalism had portrayed national politics as doomed to subjugation by the inevitable consequences of the economic forces driving international markets. A world in which Polanyi's ideas might have been heard would have had to be one in which these concepts, liberalism and socialism, did not stand for the impossibility of uniting people and maintaining social peace. The amplitude of rage in German society was equal to the magnitude of its fear towards a diffuse group of "others" who didn't seem to care about cultural identity and collective well-being. In a world open to Polanyi's ideas, politicians would not have stirred up fear and hatred towards Jews, political opponents, and homosexuals in order to promote an exclusive societal structure on the basis of "ethnic community", instead they would have upheld a principle of solidarity based on humanity. It would have to have been a world in which self-regarding behaviour was confined to the market-place and not extended into other moral spheres in society as if it were a universal anthropological paradigm (*homo oeconomicus*). And, possibly, it would have been a world in which philosophy was less fond of celebrating fatalist concepts that leave no room for political choice. Philosophy has changed a lot since the "War of Nietzsche." It should aim to help constructing a balanced conception of economic and social policies, one that leaves room for political choice and uses its potential to create a world in which Polanyi's ideas can be heard.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article.

Çıkar Çatışması Beyanı

Yazar(lar) bu makalenin yazarlık veya yayımlanmasına ilişkin olarak hiçbir çıkar çatışması olmadığını beyan etmiş(ler)dir.

REFERENCES

- Galbraith, John K. (1958). *The Affluent Society*. 40th Anniversary Edition Updated and with a New Introduction by the Author, Boston/ New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Hayek, F. A. (2007 [1944]). *The Road to Serfdom*, London: Routledge/ The University of Chicago Press.
- Keynes, J. M. (1915). "The Economics of War in Germany", *The Economic Journal*, 25 (99): 443-452.
- Nietzsche, F. (2016 [1883]). *Thus spake Zarathustra*. A book for all and none, Adelaide: The University of Adelaide, Australia. ebooks@adelaide.
- Polanyi, K. (2001 [1944]). *The Great Transformation, The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston: Beacon Press.
- Smith, A. (1999 [1776]). *The Wealth of Nations*, London: Penguin Group.
- Sombart, W. (1915). *Händler und Helden. Patriotische Besinnungen*, München: Duncker und Humblot.
- Tönnies, F. (1963 [1887]). *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Summers, H. (2018, March 26). Why we're paying the rent for a million Syrian refugees. Retrieved 2018, December 20, from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/26/scheme-cash-transfer-turkey-1m-refugees-eu-aid>
- United Nations. (2017). *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables*, New York- United Nations. Retrieved 2018, December 21, from https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf.